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11 Introduction
The study of how individuals choose their education levels and the measure-
ment of the economic returns to education has been of great interest since
Mincer (1974). This literature has consistently viewed education choice as
an investment in human capital; to be thought of in much the same way as
we think of investment in physical or ￿nancial capital (see Card, 1999, for a
comprehensive survey). It is perhaps surprising therefore, that the literature
has been relatively silent on the role played by risk in education decisions.
A possible reason for this reticence is that we have yet to achieve consensus
regarding the measurement of expected returns to education (witness the
debate between Card (2001) and Carneiro et. al. (2001) over the appropri-
a t ei n t e r p r e t a t i o no fI Ve s t i m a t e so ft h er e t u r nt os c h o o l i n g ) .T h ec o n c e p t
of risk, as measured by the variance of returns, is routinely included in theo-
retical and empirical discussions of physical and ￿nancial investment1,b u ti s
largely absent from discussions of individual schooling choice. In this paper
we try to shed some light on the eﬀect of risk on the choice of schooling,
bringing the analogy between human capital investment and other invest-
ment closer. Indeed we make use of those analytical techniques found to be
helpful in the description of ￿nancial investment under uncertainty.
While the literature on risk in education is not large, some researchers
have analysed the topic. Williams (1979) adapted the optimal portfolio
choice model of Merton (1971) to allow for investment in human capital. He
de￿ned human capital to be the market value of individual￿s current stock
of skills. The value of the human capital evolved stochastically over time
and the individual chose what proportion of her time to allocate to human
capital accumulation (as opposed to time allocated to work or leisure). The
individual￿s choice was therefore to allocate time in much the same way as
she chooses the weights in a portfolio of ￿nancial investments. Thus the
problem is very similar to that faced by Merton (1971) and his techniques
were applied to its solution.
Williams￿ (1979) approach has the advantage of, not only allowing us
to examine the eﬀects of risk, but also the eﬀect of any covariance of the
returns to human capital with the returns to ￿nancial assets. However, this
approach treats education as occurring continuously and at the same time
as work. While this may be true for some sort of on-the-job training, most
formal education (and almost all the education studied in typical ￿returns
to education￿ papers) takes place before formal work and in one go. The
problem is not so much one of portfolio choice, but more like an optimal
stopping or a tree cutting problem. A reasonable approximation to reality
is that most individuals stay in education full time until they judge it optimal
1For examples from ￿nancial investment see Merton (1971) and Campbell et.al (1997).
For physical capital see Caballero and Engle (1999) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
2to leave, and after leaving, they do not return. This view sees education as
a form of irreversible investment ￿ a special case of the classic tree cutting
problem. Stochastic versions of this and other optimal stopping problems
are analysed in Malliaris and Brock (1982) and Kamien and Schwartz (1991).
The application of these techniques to irreversible physical investment (so
called ￿real options￿) is surveyed in Dixit and Pindyck (1994). In this paper
we apply these techniques to the study of the optimal time to leave school.
In essence we view the individual in school as possessing an option to leave
at any time and take up work at a wage related (stochastically) to the time
spent in school. Once that option is exercised (i.e. the tree is cut down),
the individual cannot return to school.
Groot and Oosterbeek (1992) also look at the impact of risk on education
choice. They de￿ne an increase in risk to be a mean preserving increase in
the spread in the distribution of returns, for any arbitrary distribution. This
is a very unrestrictive de￿nition of risk, but this generality is achieved at the
cost of assuming that the individual is risk neutral. By using the techniques
of real options, we can easily accommodate risk aversion but we do so at
the cost of limiting ourselves to certain stochastic processes for returns to
education. In what follows, we treat the returns to education as being drawn
from a normal distribution.
The paper proceeds a follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the
problem and the option value approach in the certainty case. Section 3
clari￿es exactly how we model stochastic returns. Section 4 solves the model
for the simplest case involving uncertain returns. Sections 5 and 6 extend
the model to more realistic cases. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Option Approach
Card (2001) provides a model of education choice, where an individual
chooses the number of years schooling (S) in order to maximise his or her
























Assume that the minimum school leaving age is normalised to t = 0, life-
time utility is provided by consumption throughout life (i.e. both during
and after school) via u, the instantaneous utility function and also by the
direct (dis)utility of education, φ, where both u and φ are increasing concave
3functions, ρ is the constant rate of time preference, F are school fees, and
E is the expectations operator. Education choice is an optimal stopping
problem, because the individual faces a once and for all decision to leave
school (i.e. choose S) and he or she cannot return at a later date.
Following Card (2001), we will assume that the income process (2) is
time separable so that the return measured in terms of lifetime income is
the same as the return measured in terms of income over any shorter interval.
Formally we have
Yt(s)=W(s)h(t − s)
We can think of W as the starting wage after leaving education with S years
completed and h as being the factor by which the wage grows in each period
as experience and seniority are accumulated (h(0) = 1).
Note that this speci￿cation of earnings includes two probably unrealistic
simpli￿cations. Firstly, Heckman et. al. (2001) have cast doubt on the
empirical relevance of the time separability assumption, providing evidence
that in the US at least, earnings growth after leaving school is a function of
the education level.
Secondly, by making S t h ec h o i c ev a r i a b l ew ea r es a y i n gt h a te a r n i n g sa r e
a function of time spent in education and not necessarily the accumulation
of formal credentials. Of course the two are closely related, but there is
empirical evidence of so-called ￿sheep-skin￿ eﬀects i.e. non-linearities in
education choice and earnings associated with school and college completion
dates.2 We ignore both issues here as their inclusion would complicate the
analysis without shedding much light on the role of risk. But relaxing both
the time separability and linear returns assumptions are obvious extensions
for future work.
2.1 A Simple Example with Certainty
The solution to the dynamic programme depends crucially on the nature
of the budget constraint (2) and subsequent sections of the paper we make
it more realistic. For the moment, in order to illustrate the approach we
solve a simple example under certainty. To be speci￿c, we assume that
u(c)=c, and that there is no borrowing or lending, so that ct =0 ∀
t<Sand ct = Yt(s) ∀ t ≥ S. We also assume for the moment that there
are constant returns (g) to education and that ρ >g(otherwise the agent
would never leave school). In order to avoid the other corner solution (leave
school immediately) we need to assume that φ is constant through time and
positive, so that education is valued for its own sake. Finally, we assume
that individuals are in￿nitely lived (T = ∞)a n dt h a tFt =0 ,s ot h a tn e i t h e r
2See Denny and Harmon (2001).















In the absence of uncertainty we have Yt(s)=Y0 exp(gs), where the experi-
ence factor h(t−s) has been set equal to one (so that earnings are constant
after leaving school) and Y0 represents earnings with only the minimum





Y0e(g−ρ)S − φe−ρS + φ
i
which is an example of the classical tree cutting problem. Diﬀerentiating











In what follows it turns out to be more convenient to specify the school
leaving decision in terms of Y ∗, the threshold level of income. The idea
is intuitive. While in school the individual keeps an eye on the shadow
wage i.e. the wage that he would get were he to leave school immediately.
When it reaches a certain critical level, the individual will leave school. By






W ec a nt h e nr e w r i t et h ee x p r e s s i o nf o rS∗ to get
S∗ =
lnY ∗ − lnY0
g
(5)
We can also solve the problem using the real option approach similar to
that of Dixit (1993) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). In the case of certainty,
this approach is unnecessarily complicated but it turns out to be the only
practical method when returns are stochastic.
The intuition of the option approach is straight forward. At any point
in time, while the individual is still in school, he has the option of leaving
school. This option itself has value. If he exercises this option he will loose
the value of the option (because he cannot return to school in the future) and
will receive a life time income that is a function of accumulated schooling. If
he chooses not to exercise the option, its value evolves in a manner related
to the underlying income process.
More formally, Vt in (3) can be thought of as the value of the option
to leave school and start earning income at time t. Assuming that we don￿t
5exercise the option (i.e. for t ∈ [0..S]) then we can write equation (6) to
describe how V will change over time.3
pVtdt = φdt + dVt (6)
This Bellman equation (6) can best be understood as an arbitrage equation.
The right hand side is the return from staying in school (i.e. holding the
option) for length of time dt. It consists of the dividend received over the
period (which in our case is the utility derived from education) and the
capital gain or loss in the value of the option over the period. Along the
optimal path, this return must be equal to the return from the alternative
investment strategy of selling the asset and investing the proceeds at the
discount rate.
When income reaches a certain level the option is exercised, the individ-
ual leaves school and receives that income for life. The present value of this
perpetual income stream is Y ∗/ρ.T h u sa tt i m et = S, when the option is
about to be exercised, its value will equal Y ∗/ρ. If we rewrite V as a func-
tion of Y and note that dV/dt = gY ∗ dV/dY then we have (7), where VY
denotes the derivative and we drop the function￿s arguments except where
necessary.4





Equation (7) is a ￿rst order ordinary diﬀerential equation with one boundary
(￿value matching￿) condition. We can verify by substitution that the general
solution has the form V (Y )=BY θ+φ/p where θ = ρ/g and B =[ Y ∗]
1−θ /ρ.
The value matching condition explains the constant of integration in terms of
the boundary, but we need another condition to tie down the boundary itself
(i.e. the system constitutes a ￿free boundary￿ problem). This is provided
by the ￿smooth pasting￿ condition (8).
1
ρ
= VY (Y ∗)( 8 )
The smooth pasting condition ensures that the free boundary is chosen
optimally. If we stay in school now while the market wage is Y ,t h e nw e
can leave school sometime in the future and earn an even higher wage. The
value of this option, when the wage is Y, is given by V (Y ). The smooth
3We can derive (6) from (3) rigorously using Bellman￿s Principle of Optimality (see
Kamien and Schwartz, 1991, pp. 259-262 , for details).
4Throughout the paper we adopt the convention that subscripts indicate (partial)
derivatives. Thus VY is the ￿rst derivative and VYY is second derivative
6pasting condition requires that a small change in the threshold income will
have no ￿rst order eﬀect on the net gain from leaving school. When we leave
school we gain (Y/ρ)b u tl o o s eV (Y ). (Note that if the decision to leave
school could be reversed at zero cost, there would be no loss). The net gain
from leaving school when the (shadow) wage is Y is therefore Y/ρ − V (Y ),
so the optimal choice of Y ∗ implies the smooth pasting condition.
Evaluating the derivative in (8) and simplifying using the value matching
condition yields the same expression for Y ∗ as equation (4).
3 Risky Education
Before proceeding to analyse the risky case, we need to clarify what exactly
we mean by risky returns to education. In this context we mean that two
otherwise identical individuals may end up with diﬀerent lifetime income
pro￿les, just because of a diﬀerent draw from the distribution of returns to
education. Speci￿cally we model the return to schooling as being drawn from
a normal distribution. To keep things simple and to avoid time becoming a
state variable, we assume time separability and also that h(t − s)=1 .
Consider staying on in school for τ more periods. The return to this
extra schooling will equal
r(τ)=
Y (s + τ) − Y (s)
Y (s)
v N(gτ,τσ2)( 9 )
which is distributed as a normal random variable with mean g and standard
deviation σ when τ = 1. By taking limits of (9) we can show that, in
continuous time, the return to a in￿nitesimally small extra period in school





or in more usual notation
dY
Y
= gds+ σdz (10)
where dz represents the increments of a standard Weiner process i.e. where
each increment is drawn from N(0,ds). Equation (10) states that for each
instant that the individual remains in school his shadow wage trends up at
rate g. In addition at each instant the shadow wage is subject to a (propor-
tionate) shock that has zero mean and variance equal to σ2. Therefore even
if individuals start with the same (deterministic) Y0 they will end up with
5See Dixit (1993) for a derivation of a Brownian motion as the limit of a random walk.
7diﬀerent Ys. Note that in the absence of uncertainty (σ2 =0 )t h ei n c o m e
process reduces to that analysed in the previous section, i.e. Ys = Y0 exp(gs).
It will sometimes be useful to work in terms of the distribution of Y
rather than r. If returns (log wage) are normally distributed then the wage
itself will have a log-normal distribution conditional on the initial value.6
lnYs − lnY0 v N(￿s,σ2s)
￿ = g −
σ2
2
Geometric Brownian motions have been used elsewhere in economics and
operations research to model the prices of other assets.7 They are analyti-
cally convenient and have certain desirable properties. A Brownian motion
is a continuous time generalisation of a random walk (see Dixit, 1993) and is
therefore fairly intuitive. However, it does have certain speci￿cc h a r a c t e r i s -
tics that we need to be aware of. Firstly, like a random walk, it is a Markov
process. Thus the probability distribution of Y at any time in the future is
conditional on its current value and only on its current value. Knowing past
values confers no extra information. Secondly the increments of a Brown-
ian motion process that occur over any two non-overlapping intervals are
independent. Thirdly these increments are normally distributed with both
the mean and variance of a growing linearly with time i.e. var(r)=σ2ds
6=( σds)
2. Fourthly, the sample path of a Brownian motion is jagged (so
no time derivative exists) but continuous (so that no two paths will ever be
exactly the same). In fact it can be shown that the Brownian motion is the
only process that satis￿es these conditions (see Dixit, 1993).
4 Uncertainty: A Simple Case
We assume the same as for the certainty case (i.e. u(ct)=Yt,F t =0 )e x c e p t
t h a tt h es h a d o ww a g en o wf o l l o w s( 1 0 ) . A sb e f o r ew et h i n ki nt e r m so fa
option problem. Each period the individual has the option to leave school.
If she exercises this option she will receive a wage determined by the level of
schooling via (10). If she chooses not to exercise the option, she will receive
whatever in-school income/utility she has and will wait until next period
when she will have the chance to exercise the option again. By this time the
wage will have evolved, but the increment will be uncertain when viewed
from the previous period. So exercising (or not) the option involves taking
ag a m b l e .
The option to leave school is an asset whose value evolves according to
a Bellman equation similar to (6) with the added complication that we now
6Because of Ito￿s lemma dx/x 6= dlnx. See Dixit (1993) for a discussion.
7See Malliaris and Brock (1982) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for surveys and refer-
ences.
8must think in terms of the expected capital gain.




As before we view V a sb e i n gaf u n c t i o no fY. Because Y follows a Brownian
motion so does V .U s i n gI t o ￿ sl e m m a 8 we can write the stochastic diﬀerential
for V as
dV = {gYVY +
1
2
σ2Y 2VYY}dt + σYV Y dz
Note that E [dV ] contains a term in the variance of Y . This has important
implications for the eﬀect of risk on decisions. On average shocks have no
eﬀect on Y i.e. E [dY]=Yg.However if VYY > 0 they will have a positive
eﬀect on the change in the value of the option. The reason for this is that
if VYY > 0t h ee ﬀect of a negative shock will be smaller in absolute terms
than will the eﬀect of positive shocks. The results is that V will trend up
(down) because of uncertainty in Y if VYY is positive (negative).
We can substitute dV into the Bellman equation, use the fact that
E[dz] = 0 and divide by dt to get




This Bellman equation is very similar to that developed for the case of
certain returns with an additional term that re￿ects the eﬀect of uncertainty
in those returns. The equation is a second order non-homogenous ordinary
diﬀerential equation with a free boundary. We can verify by substitution
that the general solution will be
V = B1Y θ1 + B2Y θ2 + φ/ρ (13)
where θ1 is the positive characteristic root and θ2 is the negative is a root







σ2)θ − p (14)
Economic theory provides three conditions (15) that determine the two con-













8See Malliaris and Brock (1982) for a detailed discussion and Dixit (1993) for a slightly
less formal explanation.
9The ￿rst states that as the shadow wage tends to zero the individual will
never leave education and so the value of being in school will simply equal
the present value of the direct utility of perpetual education (φ/p). This
implies that the negative root, θ2, should have no in￿uence on V as Y tends
to zero. If it did then the value of the option to leave school would tend
to in￿nity as income tended to zero. The only way of ensuring this is if
B2 =0 . 9
The second part of (15) is the ￿value matching￿ condition. As in the
certainty case, it states that the value of the option to leave school is worth,
just at the time of leaving school, the present value of lifetime income. This
ties down B1 as a function of the free boundary. The third condition, the
￿smooth pasting￿ condition states that for the threshold level of income to
be chosen optimally, the net gain to any small changes in Y ∗ must have
only second order eﬀects. Using the value matching and smooth pasting













A si nt h ec a s eo fc e r t a i n t y ,s u ﬃcient conditions for Y ∗ > 0a r et h a tφ > 0
and ρ >g.I ft h el a t t e rw e r en o tt h ec a s e ,s c h o o lw o u l da l w a y sp r o v i d ea
better return (on average) and it would be optimal to stay in school for ever.
Using the implicit function theorem, we can show that Y ∗ is an increasing
function of g and a decreasing function of ρ. Thus high returns to education
will cause individuals to stay in school longer whereas a high discount rate
will induce them to leave earlier.
We can also show that the threshold value is an increasing function of
risk (see appendix) so that the threshold level of income is higher than under
certainty. Thus the introduction of risk has caused the individual to delay
leaving school. Furthermore using L￿H￿ opital￿s rule we can show that (16)
reduces to (4) as σ2 → 0. We can also show that Y ∗ becomes in￿nite as
σ2 →∞ , implying that the agent will never leave school.
Note that risk has an eﬀe c to nt h ee d u c a t i o nd e c i s i o ne v e nt h o u g ht h e
agent is apparently risk neutral i.e. u(c)=c. The reason is that leaving
school is an irreversible decision. Therefore there is an incentive to wait for
future uncertainty to resolve itself. Or to put it another way, if we stay in
school we have the option to leave next period in order to take advantage of
9This is a similar to excluding the possibility of a bubble in the price of a ￿nancial
asset.







10a good draw from the distribution of returns or to remain in education so
as to avoid a bad draw. So uncertainty increases the potential upside payoﬀ
from the option, but, because we will stay in school if the market wage turns
out to be low, the downside payoﬀ unchanged. This eﬀect becomes stronger
as the riskiness of education increases. Indeed when risk becomes in￿nite,
the agent will never want to exercise the option to leave.
Another way of seeing this is to note that while instantaneous utility is
linear (u(c)=c), lifetime utility, V ,h a sVYY > 0. Again the reason for
this is the irreversible nature of the decision to leave school. Heuristically,
an individual will tend to respond to positive shock by staying in school
so that VY > 0w h e ndY > 0. But she will tend to react to a negative
shock by leaving school so V does not grow i.e. VY =0w h e ndY < 0.
This asymmetry in the individuals￿ reaction, is due to the impossibility of
returning to school, and generates VYY > 0.
Note that the predictions of the model are radically diﬀerent from those
of the portfolio approach of Williams (1979). In his model, an increase in
the risk of human capital (or any other asset), would cause the individual to
accumulate less of it, other things being equal. In our model, however, an
increase in risk will cause an individual to accumulate more human capital
by staying in school longer. The reason for this diﬀerence is the nature of
the choice facing the agent. In Williams (1979) she could come in and out
of education as she pleases for zero cost. In our model, she cannot return to
education once she has decided to leave.
Because the evolution of income is stochastic, there is no expression for S
corresponding to (5) for the certainty case. S∗ will be a random variable and
the best we can do is to describe its distribution. An analytical description
of the full distribution is complicated (although see Malliaris and Brock
(1982) for an example). Instead we describe it numerically by simulating
the system. Let g =0 .07, σ =0 .02 and ρ =0 .1 all arbitrary but plausible
values. We also set Y0 =1 0 ,000 to represent annual income of those with
only compulsory schooling and choose φ =4 ,5 6 5t or e p r e s e n tn e ti n c o m e
during school. This value for φ is chosen so that the optimal choice of
schooling under certainty from (5) is equal to S∗ = 6. This is arbitrary, but
allows us to focus on the eﬀect of introducing uncertainty.
Using these values we can calculate the threshold income (Y ∗)u n d e rc e r -
tainty from (4) to be equal to 15,216. Under uncertainty the corresponding
value from (16) of Y ∗ =1 5 ,260 which is less than one percent higher. If the
individual starts with income Y0 =1 0 ,000 how long will it take for income
to reach the threshold value when it evolves according to (10)? We can work
out the distribution function of S∗ as in (17) below. The probability that
an individual will still be in school at time t (so that S∗ greater than t)i s
equal to the probability that the income process will not have reached the
trigger level at time t. Note that lnYt − lnY0 ∼ N(￿t,σ2t),￿ = g − σ2/2
11and Φ is the c.d.f. of a standard normal random variable.
P(S∗ ≤ t)=1− P(S∗ >t )









Numerical simulation of equation (17) shows that the density of schooling
times is approximately normal with mean 6.17 and variance of 0.51. This is
not too diﬀerent from the model with certain returns, re￿ecting the relatively
low level of uncertainty. Figure 1 plots a surface where each cross-section
represents the density function and the z axis represents increasing variance
of returns. As can be seen, the density of S∗ ￿attens as σ increases, but
always remains centered near the certainty value of 6. In order to make this
clearer, Table 1 shows the summary statistics for each level of risk.
5 Diminishing Returns
The model of the last section introduced some useful concepts but was un-
realistic in several important ways. In particular, constant returns requires
the further assumption that school provides positive utility directly in order
to avoid a corner solution. In this section will allow for returns to diminish




=( α0 − α1Y )dS + σdz
This process is similar to the geometric Brownian motion (10) of the last
section and we can apply similar techniques. Note that we have speci￿ed
the return to education to be a diminishing function of the shadow wage and
not a of elapsed schooling time. We do this for analytical convenience so as
to avoid getting a partial deferential equation with time as a state variable.
As before, the Bellman equation (11) describes the evolution of the value
of the option to leave school over the period [0..S]. Using Ito￿s lemma we
evaluate the stochastic diﬀerential dV. As before notice that the trend rate
of growth of V is in￿uenced by variability of Y as well as by the trend in Y.
dV =
‰





dt + {σVY Y }dz
Replacing dV in the Bellman equation, dividing across by dt and using
E[dz] = 0 we get a second order ordinary diﬀerential equation similar to
12(12) with the exception that we have a slightly more complicated expression
in place of g.




It can be veri￿ed by substitution that (18) is a general solution to a dif-
ferential equation of this form where H(.) is the series representation of
the con￿uent hypergeometric function11 and θ1 and θ2 are the positive and
negative roots, respectively, of σ2
2 θ(θ − 1) + α0θ − p =0 .










θ(θ +1 ) ( θ +2 )







b ≡ 2θ +
2α0
σ2
As before we can use the fact that V (Y ) → φ/p as Y → 0t os e tB2 =0 .
The value matching and smooth pasting conditions have the same form as
(15) and de￿ne Y ∗ and B implicitly. If we solve for Y ∗ we get (19) which
itself must be solved numerically as both H and HY are in￿nite series.







=1 ( 1 9 )
Note that the solution to this model incorporates the solution to the
simpler model of the last section as a special case. If we eliminate the
diminishing returns and set α1 =0t h e nHY = 0 and (19) reduces to (16).
T a b l e2s h o w sv a l u e so fY ∗ for certain sample values of α0, α1 and σ cal-
culated by numerical simulation of (19). For these simulations we normalize
Y0 =1a n ds e tφ = 0 as with diminishing returns it is no longer needed to
avoid a corner solution. We also assume that ρ =0 .1. Examination of the
table con￿rms that Y ∗ is increasing in α0 and decreasing in α1. As before,
higher returns to education provide an incentive to stay in school. Now we
have the additional factor that the return to education is lower at higher
levels of education. This provides an incentive to leave education earlier.
We can also see from Table 2 that the threshold level of income is an
increasing function of uncertainty. Greater risk will cause the individual to
delay leaving school. Again this eﬀect occurs even though the agent is risk
neutral, and for the same reason as before￿ irreversibility in the presence of
uncertainty provides an incentive to delay the decision until the uncertainty
resolves itself.
11See Dixit and Pindyk (1994) page 163 and the referneces cited therein. Note that H
reduces to the exponential function when b = θ.
136R i s k A v e r s i o n
6.1 Liquidity Constrained
The previous sections assumed that the agent was risk neutral. In this sec-
tion we allow for individuals to have preferences over risk. For the moment
we still impose that there be no borrowing or lending, so that the issue of
consumption smoothing does not yet arise. In other words we assume that
ct =0 ∀ t<Sand ct = Y ∗ ∀ t>S .In this case it turns out that
the solution is more or less the same as in the previous two sections. The
Bellman equation is given by (11) as before (we continue to assume that an
individual receives net utility of φ from participation in education) and so
will have the same general solution as before i.e. either (13) or (18) depend-
ing on the process for the shadow wage. The form of the utility function
only aﬀects utility after leaving school as we have precluded the possibil-
ity that the agent may borrow against future income in order to subsidize
consumption before graduation.
In fact the only diﬀerence between this formulation and the previous
section is the boundary conditions. When the individual exercises his option
to leave school he will receive lifetime utility equal to Ω. We can calculate this
by direct integration assuming that income is constant at Y ∗after graduation










As before we assume V (0) = φ/ρ. The value matching and smooth past-
ing conditions become, V (Y ∗)=Ω(Y ∗), and VY (Y ∗)=ΩY (Y ∗) respectively.
These have the same interpretation as in the last section, only their form
has changed slightly. The resulting threshold income (20) is qualitatively
the same as before. All the derivatives of Y ∗ h a v et h es a m es i g na sb e f o r e ;









In order to make the problem interesting we need to allow the individual to
borrow against future income in order to subsidize consumption while in full
time education. The absence of liquidity constraints raises the possibility
that an individual will stay in education longer, borrowing to fund consump-
tion during the school years and paying back the debt from higher future
earnings. In a world of certainty, the individual￿s decision making problem
14can be broken into two steps. First he chooses school in order to maximise
lifetime earnings and secondly he allocates these earning through time using
the capital markets so as to perfectly smooth consumption. This two stage
p r o c e s sb r e a k sd o w nw h e nw ec o m b i n eu n c e r t a i n t yw i t ha ni r r e v e r s i b i l i t y
















This maximisation is subject to the budget constraint (2) and the stochas-
t i cr e t u r n st oe d u c a t i o n( 1 0 ) .W er e w r i t eb o t hi nd i ﬀerential form as (22).
dAt =( rAt − F − ct)dt ∀ t ∈ [0..S]
dAt =( rAt + Yt − ct)dt ∀ t ∈ [S..∞]
dYt = gYtdt + σdz ∀ t ∈ [0..S]
dYt = αYtdt ∀ t ∈ [S..∞]
(22)
The ￿rst equation in (22) states that individual in school must ￿nance
consumption and (constant) school fees, F, by running down asset balances.
The second equation states that after graduation asset balances can be re-
built using earned income. The third equation in (22) shows the evolution
of the shadow wage while the individual is in school. As before we assume
that the shadow wage evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion
so that returns to education are normally distributed and the level of the
wage upon graduation is lognormally distributed. The ￿nal equation in (22)
states that earned income will grow at rate α after leaving school. In order
to keep things (relatively) simple we assume that this growth rate is deter-
ministic. Thus Yt = Y ∗eα(t−S) where Y ∗ is the threshold level of (shadow)
wage at when the individual decides to leave school after S periods. Finally,
in order to ensure convergence of the integral we assume that p is greater
than g, r and α.
Also note that this formulation precludes insurance or any hedging of
labour income uncertainty as the only other asset has returns that are not
correlated with the returns to education. If we did have perfect insurance
against risk in education, the problem would reduce to one of maximising
expected life-time income and would reduce to that of section 4.
The Bellman equation associated with (21)-(22) is given by (23) where
subscripts indicate partial derivatives. Note that the value function, V, is
now a function of two state variables, the wage (as before) and also the level
15of net ￿nancial assets.
ρV =m a x
c
‰
u(c)+φ + VY gY + VYY
σ2
2
Y 2 + VA(rA − F − c)
￿
(23)
As before we think of school attendance as possession of an option to
leave school and earn a salary. The value of this option, V , evolves according
to (23). There are some diﬀerences with the Bellman equations of previous
sections. Firstly, the per period payoﬀ (￿dividend￿) of being in school is
now expressed in terms of utility u(c)+φ, where the ￿rst term represents
the utility of consumption while in school and the second represents the in-
trinsic utility (or disutility) from being in school. Secondly, school fees (F)
must be deducted from the cash available for consumption. The third, and
most important diﬀerence, is that the individual is able to subsidize con-
sumption while in school by running down asset balances. To this end the
individual can choose the level of consumption while in school to maximise
lifetime utility or equivalently to maximise the value of the option to quit
school.12 Assuming that the individual will always choose consumption op-
timally given assets and the wage (i.e. education) then we have the standard
￿rst order condition for intertemporal consumption smoothing
uc(c)=VA
If we assume that utility is CRRA, u(c)=c1−γ/(1 − γ), and substitute the
￿rst order condition into the Bellman equation, we get equation (24) that
describes the stochastic evolution of the option to quit school, conditional







+ φ + gYVY + VYY
σ2
2
Y 2 + VA(rA− F) (24)
We can verify by substitution that the solution to (24) is given by (25)
where θ1 is the positive root of Q in (14) and we have eliminated the negative
root in order to impose ￿nite value on the option.




(rγ − r + ρ)
γ (1 − γ)
Equation (25) is intuitive. The last two terms are the same as (13), the value
function for the simplest case. (Nonetheless the value assigned to the option
will be diﬀerent as B1 will be diﬀerent.) The ￿r s tp a r to f( 2 5 )r e p r e s e n t s
12The two are equivalent due to Bellman￿s Principle of Optimality. See Kamien and
Schwartz, 1991, op. cit.
16the life-time utility derived from consumption out of ￿nancial assets. In
eﬀect the introduction of ￿nancial assets creates a lower bound for life-time
utility. The worst case for the individual is that she never leaves school. In
this case she would consume out of assets for ever and enjoy the direct utility
of schooling generating a life-time utility of V = B0(A−F/r)1−γ+φ/ρ.O n l y
in the case where the the option to leave school has positive value, will she
exercise it at some point, leave school and achieve a life-time utility strictly
greater than the lower bound.
When the individual exercises his option and leaves school she will receive
a certain salary which will generate a certain lifetime utility, Ω (i.e. the
second integral in (21)). The exact value of of post school life-time utility,
Ω(Y,A), depends on how wages evolve after leaving school. Using the usual
argument we can construct (26) a Bellman equation for Ω.
ρΩ =m i n
c {u(c)+ΩY αY + ΩA(rA + Y − c)} (26)
This equation is similar to (24) but diﬀerent in interpretation. The indi-
vidual once again chooses consumption so as to maximise the value of life
time utility condition on assets and the process of income. Here, however,
the wage is actually received by the individual as she is working, whereas
for equation (24), the Y was the shadow wage i.e. the wage the individual
would get the moment he left school. As the individual has left education at
this stage, there are no optimal stopping problem and no value matching or
smooth pasting conditions. The necessary boundary conditions are provided
by the assumption that the integral in (21) converges i.e. life time utility is
￿nite.
If we assume that consumption is optimally chosen after leaving school





Not surprisingly, given the structure of the problem, (27) has the same
form as the ￿r s tt e r mo f( 2 5 ) ,b u tt h e r ei sac r u c i a ld i ﬀerence between
the two. We can view (27) as stating that life-time utility is a function of
total wealth, equal to the sum of ￿nancial wealth, A,a n dh u m a nc a p i t a l
Y/(r−α). This follows from the assumption that the optimizing individual
will borrow against future income in order to smooth consumption after
graduation. The situation is diﬀerent before graduation, however. The
human capital term is absent from the ￿rst term in (25). The reason is
that, strictly speaking, the individual has no marketable human capital,
before graduation. What she does have is the option to acquire marketable
human capital (by leaving school) at some date in the future. The value
of this option appears additively in the value function and not within the
parentheses in the same manner as A, because we assume that the option
17to leave school is an asset which may have value, but nevertheless cannot
be traded or used as a collateral for a loan. In that sense there is a liquidity
constraint in this problem albeit one that is entirely realistic.
Note also that V is only de￿ned when rA > F i.e. when assets are greater
than the present value of future school fees. If this condition is violated then
the nature of the problem is fundamentally altered. The reason is that the
individual must be able pay her way in school or else she will forced to leave
school. The problem is no longer one of optimal stopping as there is no
longer a free choice of when to exercise the option. Furthermore, while it
may appear from the requirement that rA > F that there is some restriction
on borrowing against future income, this is not so. As can be seen from the
integral version of the budget constraint (2), the agent is free to borrow
and lend unlimited amounts subject only life-time budget balance and the
inability to trade the option to leave school.
Finally note that the structure of the problem implies that consumption
will jump upon graduation. To see this note that VA(A,Y ∗) > ΩA(A,Y ∗).
The reason is that graduation converts the option (which cannot be traded)
into human capital which can, so consumable wealth jumps.
We ￿nd the threshold income by imposing the value matching and smooth
pasting conditions (28) both of which have the same interpretation as before.
V (Y ∗,A)=Ω(Y ∗,A)
(28)
VY (Y ∗,A)=ΩY (Y ∗,A)
The result is a system of two non-linear simultaneous equations that jointly
determine B1 and Y ∗ conditional on A and F and the parameters of the
model. Eliminating B1 g e n e r a t e sa ne x p r e s s i o n( 2 9 )t h a td e ￿nes Y ∗ implic-
itly.
B0(A − F/r)1−γ + φ/ρ − B0(A + Y
r−α)1−γ +
B0(1−γ)Y
θ(r−α) (A + Y
r−α)−γ =0
(29)
We show in the appendix that we can apply the implicit function theorem
to show that Y ∗ is an increasing function of g and a decreasing function of
ρ. Thus high returns to education will cause individuals to stay in school
longer whereas a high discount rate will induce them to leave earlier. We
can also show that the threshold value is an increasing function of risk.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we apply the techniques of option theory to the study the
education decisions of individuals when the returns to education are uncer-
tain. We view an individual in school as possessing an option to leave at
any time and take up work at a wage related (stochastically) to the time
18spent in school. Once that option is exercised, the individual cannot return
to school.
We show that high returns to education will cause individuals to stay in
school longer whereas a high discount rate will induce them to leave earlier.
Furthermore we also show that increasing risk will cause an individual to
delay leaving school. This result is not dependent on the risk preferences of
agents as it holds for risk neutral agents also. On the face of it, this is curious
result, we would expect that higher risk would lead to less investment in
human capital. The result stems from treating education as an option. Once
the agent leaves school, he can never return. Higher uncertainty, therefore
provides an incentive to delay leaving so as to see if uncertainty may resolve
itself.
A Solution of Equation (29)
Equation (29) implicitly de￿nes the threshold level of income for the model
with consumption smoothing













We ￿rst evaluate the derivatives of G below
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All these derivatives can be signed if we note that γ < 1, which follows
from the de￿nition of CRRA utility, and θ1 > 1 which follows from the
assumption that ρ >g .







We also know from applying the implicit function theorem to (14) that











































So it follows that the threshold income is an increasing function of g and
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22Table 1: Optimal School Leaving
Education Threshold Time in School (S∗)
Risk Income
σ Y ∗ E(S∗) Va r (S∗)S k e w n e s s
0 15,216 6.0 0.0 0.0
0.01 15,228 6.09 0.125 0.172
0.02 15,260 6.17 0.511 0.348
0.03 15,314 6.32 1.21 0.518
0.04 15,390 6.52 2.23 0.592
0.05 15,486 6.72 3.35 0.521
0.06 15,604 6.88 4.35 0.409
0.07 15,757 6.98 5.16 0.312
0.08 15,900 7.03 5.87 0.234
0.09 16,077 7.05 6.35 0.185
1. Simulation of basic model as in equation (17)
2. Key parameters: Y0 = 10000; ρ =0 .1; g =0 .07; φ =4 ,565
see text for discussion
23Table 2: Threshold Income when there are Diminishing Returns
α0 0.15 0.15 0.2 0.2
α1 0 . 0 2 50 . 0 50 . 0 20 . 0 1
Risk (σ)
0.00 2.00 1.00 5.00 10.00
0.02 2.01 1.01 5.01 10.02
0.04 2.02 1.01 5.04 10.08
0.06 2.04 1.02 5.09 10.18
0.08 2.07 1.04 5.16 10.31
0.10 2.1 1.05 5.24 10.47
0.12 2.14 1.07 5.33 10.65
0.14 2.18 1.09 5.43 10.85
0.16 2.23 1.12 5.54 11.08
0.18 2.28 1.14 5.66 11.32
0.20 2.33 1.17 5.79 11.57
1. Simulation of basic model as in equation (19)
2. Key parameters: Y0 =1 ;ρ =0 .1; φ =0
see text for discussion
24Figure 1: